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Designers use third-party intellectual property (IP) cores and outsource various steps in the integrated circuit (IC) design and manufacturing flow. As a result, security vulnerabilities have been rising. This is forcing IC designers and end users to re-evaluate their trust in ICs. If attackers get hold of an unprotected IC, they can reverse engineer the IC and pirate the IP. Similarly, if attackers get hold of a design, they can insert malicious circuits or take advantage of “backdoors” in a design. Unintended design bugs can also result in security weaknesses. This tutorial paper provides an introduction to the domain of hardware security through two pedagogical examples of hardware security problems. The first is a walk-through of the scan chain-based side channel attack. The second is a walk-through of logic locking of digital designs. The tutorial material is accompanied by open access digital resources that are linked in this article. 

Cybersecurity attacks on embedded devices for industrial control systems and cyber-physical systems may cause catastrophic physical damage as well as economic loss. This could be achieved by infecting device binaries with malware that modifies the physical characteristics of the system operation. Mitigating such attacks benefits from reverse engineering tools that recover sufficient semantic knowledge in terms of mathematical equations of the implemented algorithm. Conventional reverse engineering tools can decompile binaries to low-level code, but offer little semantic insight. This article proposes the REMaQE automated framework for reverse engineering of math equations from binary executables. Improving over state-of-the-art, REMaQE handles equation parameters accessed via registers, the stack, global memory, or pointers, and can reverse engineer equations from object-oriented implementations such as C++ classes. Using REMaQE, we discovered a bug in the Linux kernel thermal monitoring tool “tmon.” To evaluate REMaQE, we generate a dataset of 25,096 binaries with math equations implemented in C and Simulink. REMaQE successfully recovers a semantically matching equation for all 25,096 binaries. REMaQE executes in 0.48 seconds on average and in up to 2 seconds for complex equations. Real-time execution enables integration in an interactive math-oriented reverse engineering workflow. 

Automating hardware design could obviate a signif-icant amount of human error from the engineering process and lead to fewer errors. Verilog is a popular hardware description language to model and design digital systems, thus generating Verilog code is a critical first step. Emerging large language models (LLMs) are able to write high-quality code in other programming languages. In this paper, we characterize the ability of LLMs to generate useful Verilog. For this, we fine-tune pre-trained LLMs on Verilog datasets collected from GitHub and Verilog textbooks. We construct an evaluation framework comprising test-benches for functional analysis and a flow to test the syntax of Verilog code generated in response to problems of varying difficulty. Our findings show that across our problem scenarios, the fine-tuning results in LLMs more capable of producing syntactically correct code (25.9% overall). Further, when analyzing functional correctness, a fine-tuned open-source CodeGen LLM can outperform the state-of-the-art commercial Codex LLM (6.5% overall). We release our training/evaluation scripts and LLM checkpoints as open source contributions. 

Additive manufacturing (AM) systems such as 3-D printers use inexpensive microcontrollers that rarely feature cybersecurity defenses. This is a risk, especially given the rising threat landscape within the larger digital manufacturing domain. In this work, we demonstrate this risk by presenting the design and study of a malicious Trojan (the FLAW3D bootloader) for AVR-based Marlin-compatible 3-D printers (>100 commercial models). We show that the Trojan can hide from programming tools, and even within tight design constraints (less than 1.7 KB in size), it can compromise the quality of additively manufactured prints and reduce tensile strengths by up to 50%.